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INTRODUCTION

“Right now, I feel like I could take on the whole empire myself,” Dak
declared shortly before the Battle of Hoth.1 Though Luke Skywalker’s copilot did not mean American federal bureaucracy, the United States
Congress shared a similar disdain for growing executive power when it
passed the Congressional Review Act (CRA) in 1996. Little did Congress
know, it would take twenty years to actually take on the executive branch.
However, in the past five years, the CRA has become a critical congressional
tool for both Republicans and Democrats.
Republicans started using the CRA more frequently during the Obama
Administration—a product of their congressional majorities and skepticism
for new regulation.2 But, without the White House, they could do little to
check new regulations promulgated by President Obama’s Administration.3
Following the election of President Donald Trump, Republicans felt
they finally could tackle the administrative state that their progressive
opponents spent decades building through legislation, court cases, and
countless major regulations. Republicans acted swiftly to strike down
Obama-era regulations using the CRA.4 Few on Capitol Hill or in the
conservative policy community expected this many successful CRA actions.5
Many noted the Republican Senate majority was thin and floor time would
be consumed with health-care repeal votes, nominations, and possible votes
on tax reform.6

1.
2.

THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (20th Century Fox 1980).
U.S. H.R., History, Art, and Archives, Party Divisions of the House of
Representatives, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/
[https://perma.cc/MU67-SB2A]; U.S. S., Art and History, United States
Senate Party Division, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/9JH6GJB6].
3. Thomas Frank, Republicans: We Don’t Need No Regulation, THE GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/06/republicans-no-business-regulation
[https://perma.cc/KXX2-W9HL].
4. Signed into Law: Congressional Review Act (CRA) Resolutions, House Republican
Conf. (Jun. 1, 2018) (listing the sixteen Congressional Review Act resolutions repealing
regulations originating from the Obama Administration), http://www.gop.gov/cra/
[https://perma.cc/J6WK-8GP9].
5. Conversations with congressional employees suggested that Congress would repeal
a maximum of twelve regulations. Some staff predicted only one or two successful CRA
resolutions.
6. Sam Brodey, The 5 Things the Republican Congress Will Get Done – or at Least
Try to – in 2017, MINNPOST, https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2017/01/5-thingsrepublican-congress-will-get-done-or-least-try-2017/ [https://perma.cc/QGB8-ANGK].
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The policy community doubted that a majority of Senate Republicans
would agree on more than eight to ten resolutions to disapprove.7
Furthermore, many were certain that Democrats would almost universally
oppose Republican attempts to undo President Obama’s environmental
and labor standard accomplishments.8 However, according to some
scholars, Congress exceeded expectations and nullified sixteen regulations
using the CRA’s provisions.9
Moreover, the decision of Senate Democrats to wield the CRA to press
for a vote to overturn the Federal Communications Commission’s net
neutrality repeal showed the CRA has become more than a partisan
cudgel.10 The CRA is now an institutionalized tool of the legislative branch
to check the executive power. Democrats shifted from arguing that the CRA
was an extreme mechanism to undermine President Obama’s
accomplishments to employing the CRA to advance their own agenda.11
Additionally, Congress has found new and innovative ways to employ
the CRA to overturn executive branch actions.12 At first, only the province
of a widely dismissed 2017 Wall Street Journal editorial,13 Congress asked
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) about the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB’s) auto-lending guidance document.14
The GAO ruled the guidance constituted a rule under the CRA, even
7. Based on personal conversations with scholars at the Brookings Institution, the
Mercatus Center, and the George Washington Regulatory Studies Center.
8. See e.g., Michelle V. Rafter, The Workplace Legacy of Barack Obama,
WORKFORCE,
https://www.workforce.com/2017/01/17/workplace-legacy-barack-obama/
[https://perma.cc/75ZE-B8QC] (discussing improved labor standards under President
Obama); Keith Gaby, Ready to Defend Obama’s Environmental Legacy? Top 10
Accomplishments
to
Focus
on,
ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE
FUND,
https://www.edf.org/blog/2017/01/12/ready-defend-obamas-environmental-legacy-top-10accomplishments-focus [https://perma.cc/N4WW-H4E6] (discussing the environmental
protection accomplishments of the Obama Administration).
9. House Republican Conf., supra note 4.
10. See S.J. Res. 52, 115th Cong. (2018).
11. Id.; see also 163 CONG. REC. H831–40 (2017) (discussing Congressman James
McGovern’s (D-MA) argument against striking down the Bureau of Land Management’s
Stream Protection Rule).
12. See Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-72, 132 Stat. 1290 (2018) (nullifying down the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau’s auto lending guidance document).
13. See Kimberly Strassel, A GOP Regulatory Game Changer, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26,
2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-gop-regulatory-game-changer1485478085/ [https://perma.cc/FL2W-CFKC].
14. See GAO Issues Opinions on Applicability of Congressional Review Act to Two
Guidance Documents, EVERYCRSREPORT (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.everycrsreport.com
/reports/IN10808.html [https://perma.cc/5GQ5-K66Y].
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though it was issued beyond the sixty-legislative-day-review window outlined
in the CRA.15 The use of the CRA to nullify past guidance documents is
profound and has significant potential ramifications.
Congress can now go back years, even decades, to strike down past
administrative guidance.16 Although a new president could unilaterally
rescind the guidance issued by a previous administration, the CRA provides
an added layer of protection by ensuring that a future executive cannot
reissue the rule “in substantially the same form.”17 There has not yet been
any litigation surrounding this ambiguous statement since many agencies shy
away from reissuing the rule, leaving the nullified policy in regulatory
purgatory.18 However, now that sixteen additional rules have been nullified,
it is more likely that a previously rejected rule might rise from the grave—
creating the possibility of litigation over the “substantially the same form”
language.19
This article argues that the CRA has played a role rebalancing power
between the executive and legislative branches. Congressional use of the
CRA by both parties—on major rules and guidance—has put every future
executive on notice that Congress will scrutinize the process (regardless of
whether rules are submitted to Congress in the correct manner) and the
substance of future executive action.
Part II offers a history of the CRA from its beginnings as part of a
unicameral legislative veto to the modern CRA in 1996, including the
limited debate surrounding CRA passage. The article also surveys the
relevant dormancy period of the CRA from 1997 to 2016. Part III describes
the current environment, including the reemergence of the CRA after the
2016 election. Part IV discusses bipartisan use of the CRA to strike down
agency action and the institutionalization of the CRA. Part V surveys the
CRA’s future and examines how the past few years might influence future
executive action.

15. Id.
16. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2018) (disapproving the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau’s auto lending guidance far outside of the CRA’s “carryover” period).
17. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (1996).
18. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (nullifying down the Department of
Labor’s ergonomics rule in 2001). Yet, after more than seventeen years, the DOL has yet to
reissue the rule. See, e.g., John Ho, OSHA and Ergonomics: The Past, Present and Future,
EHS TODAY (Jun. 22, 2017), https://www.ehstoday.com/osha/osha-and-ergonomics-pastpresent-and-future [https://perma.cc/XZH4-PMUD].
19. See House Republican Conf., supra note 4.

354

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:2

II. HISTORY OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT
In INS v. Chadha, the Supreme Court struck down the last vestiges of
the legislative veto.20 Following this decision, Congress struggled to check
executive regulation for more than a decade. Congress could always pass a
law striking down a regulation, but that would likely require a two-thirds vote
in both houses of Congress since any sitting president would presumably
object to a legislative attempt to rescind a recent rule.21 It takes years—
sometimes decades—to implement a regulation, and presidents are rarely
willing to sign away rules after such a thorough vetting by the president’s own
appointees.22
After Chadha, Congress could still employ appropriations “riders,”
which insert a restriction on funding for a policy disfavored by Congress into
a larger appropriations bill necessary to operate the federal government.23
Riders are constitutional because the president must ultimately sign them
into law. Typically, the executive and legislative branches will reach an
agreement regarding the acceptable restrictions on new rules.24 For example,
President Obama signed several larger legislative packages with
appropriations riders buried in them that limited the immediate
implementation of his own rules.25 However, Congress found that passing
new legislation and appropriations riders did not allow it to effectively
control administrative action. Congress wanted a more immediate and
permanent way to check the executive branch that did not require vetoproof majorities. Surprisingly, Congress found a solution through legislation
with broad bipartisan support.26
20. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that a one-chamber legislative veto
over executive branch action is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution’s
presentment and bicameralism requirements).
21. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
22. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 571.111 (2019) (codifying the Department of
Transportation’s rear-view camera rule, which was in pre-rule stage in the spring of 2009, but
the final version was not effective until June 6, 2014).
23. See, e.g., U.S. Senate, U.S. Senate Glossary Term,
https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/rider.htm [https://perma.cc/Q4AV-SB7M].
24. Erik Wasson, Obama Says He’s Not Bound by Guantanamo, Gun-Control
Provisions, THE HILL (Dec. 23, 2011), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/201245-obamasays-he-wont-be-bound-by-guantanamo-gun-control-portions-of-omnibus
[https://perma.cc/Y52A-C2ZW].
25. Id.
26. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 251,
110 Stat. 847, 869-74 (1996) (passing the U.S. Senate with unanimous consent and the U.S.
House of Representatives 328-91 as part of the broader Contract with America Advancement
Act of 1996).
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Historical Vestiges

When Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952,
it reserved the right for either the House of Representatives or the Senate
to invalidate a decision of the executive; namely, the decision of the attorney
general to allow a deportable immigrant to remain in the United States.27
Few in Congress at the time likely understood the weight of this provision.
However, seventeen years later, this provision would find itself in the
Supreme Court.28
In Chadha, Jagdish Rai Chadha, overstayed his student visa and the
Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) ordered him to provide a
reason why he should not be deported.29 Then, an immigration judge, acting
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, suspended Chadha’s
deportation.30 The House of Representatives overturned the suspension and
the immigration court reopened the deportation proceedings.31 Chadha
then argued that the legislative veto portion of the Immigration and
Nationality Act violated the U.S. Constitution, specifically alleging it violated
the bicameral and presentment requirements of Article I.32
After finding Chadha had standing and the issue was justiciable, the
Supreme Court agreed that the legislative veto violated Article I of the
Constitution.33 Writing for a six-to-three majority, Chief Justice Warren
Burger found that the House of Representatives had essentially carried out
a legislative function when it vetoed Chadha’s suspended deportation.34
However, the Constitution demands all legislative action pass both the

27. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414 § 244(c), 66 Stat. 216
(1952), invalidated by I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
28. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 919.
29. Id. at 923.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 926.
32. Id. at 946, 948.
33. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 (“It emerges clearly that the prescription for legislative
action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers’ decision that the legislative power of the
Federal government be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure.”).
34. Id. at 956 (“[W]hen the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on one House,
independent of the other House, or of the President, they did so in explicit, unambiguous
terms. . . . These exceptions are narrow . . . [and] provide further support for the conclusion
that Congressional authority is not to be implied and for the conclusion that the veto
provided for in § 244(c)(2) is not authorized[.]”).
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House of Representatives and Senate and be signed by the president.35
Therefore, the House’s action was invalid.36
More than a generation later, the Supreme Court’s ruling might seem
obvious. At the time, however, the Supreme Court’s decision wrested
substantial power from Congress. In fact, “[s]ince 1932, when the first veto
provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures
[had] been inserted in 196 different statutes[.]”37 Nevertheless, despite
Congress’s affection for this power, the Court declined to extend it any
further. Chief Justice Burger wrote, “the fact that a given law or procedure
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government,
standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”38
For Congress, the Chadha decision was a major setback. Not only did
Congress lose the legislative veto on immigration decisions, but also it lost
the legislative veto authorized in hundreds of other statutes. This reality was
not lost in Justice White’s dissent:
Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell
for nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has
reserved a “legislative veto.” . . . The prominence of the legislative
veto mechanism in our contemporary political system and its
importance to Congress can hardly be overstated. It has become
a central means by which Congress secures the accountability of
executive and independent agencies. Without the legislative veto,
Congress is faced with a Hobson’s choice: either to refrain from
delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless
task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless
special circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the
alternative, to abdicate its law-making function to the executive
branch and independent agencies.39
Justice White likely did not realize it at the time, but he was forecasting
what many in Congress—specifically Republicans—would argue in the future
about the nature of regulation, congressional delegation, and the balance of
power between the executive and legislative branch. In this Hobson’s
choice, Congress often delegates vast amounts of power to executive
agencies by crafting legislation in broad terms and leaving the details to
35.
36.
37.

Id.
See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
Id. at 944 (quoting James Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary
Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L. REV. 323, 324
(1977)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 967–68.
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agencies.40 However, Congress could only tolerate this approach for roughly
a decade before the legislative veto would return—this time in a new form to
correct the bicameralism and presentment problems identified by the Court
in Chadha.

B.

Debate and Enactment

The 1994 “Gingrich Revolution” ushered fifty-four additional
Republicans into the House of Representatives and nine new Republicans
into the Senate, creating Republican majorities in both chambers.41 With
these new majorities, Republicans moved quickly on their “Contract with
America” that included a host of deregulatory measures beyond just the
CRA.42
Indeed, Congress received little credit for the amount of reform they
successfully enacted with the help of their political opponent, President
Clinton.43 In addition to the CRA, Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act, amendments to the Paperwork Reduction Act, and
amendments to the Regulatory Flexibility Act.44 It did so, somehow, with
strong support in both the House of Representatives and Senate.45 For as
much controversy as the CRA garnered at the beginning of the Trump
Administration, it was a relative afterthought during the mid-1990s.
The CRA’s legislative history is surprisingly brief, which is one reason
many worry about the fate of rules rescinded under its provisions. The
prospects for crafting a second rule that is substantially dissimilar from the
first iteration remains murky. The CRA only spans five pages of the

40. See, e.g., Does Congress Delegate Too Much Power to Agencies and What Should
Be Done About It?: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Economic Growth,
Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the Committee on Government Reform, 106th
Cong. 219 (2001), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg71984/html/CHRG106hhrg71984.htm [https://perma.cc/WCC7-DKK9].
41. U.S. H.R., History, Art, and Archives, Party Divisions of the U.S. House of
Representatives, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/
[https://perma.cc/8LM4-CGMJ]; U.S. S., United States Senate Party Divisions,
https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/SY5Z-9NMS].
42. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48
(1995).
43. See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104–13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995);
Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996)
(containing amendments to the Regulatory Flexibility Act).
44. Id.
45. See Contract with America Advancement Act, supra note 43 (passing by a vote of
328-91 in the House of Representatives and unanimously approved by the Senate).
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Congressional Record and provides limited insight into Congressional
intent.46
Senators Don Nickles (R-OK), Harry Reid (D-NV), and Ted Stevens
(R-AK) were the CRA’s chief sponsors.47 At the outset, the Senators
addressed the defects in previous legislative vetoes: bicameralism and
presentment.48 They noted, “[The CRA] uses the mechanism of a joint
resolution of disapproval which requires passage . . . Congress and the
President[.] In other words, enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval
is the same as enactment of a law.”49 This reality is sometimes lost on critics
of the CRA who claim it is “a legislative gimmick” or that the law is
unconstitutional.50
The CRA simply makes it easier to pass a law to overturn a regulation.
Absent the CRA, if Congress and the president desired, as soon as a rule
was published in the Federal Register, they could immediately pass a law to
rescind it. The CRA’s main innovation is a set of expedited procedures for
legislative action.51 CRA Section 802 ensures that all points of order against
resolutions of disapproval are waived, motions to reconsider are not in
order, and debate is limited to ten hours.52
The CRA’s expedited procedures allow Congress to review a statutory
category of federal agency rules and determine whether the rules will take
effect.53 Essentially, the CRA directs federal agencies to submit all newly
promulgated rules to Congress and the Comptroller General.54 Congress
can then schedule a vote for a joint resolution of disapproval, thereby
46. See 142 Cong. Rec. 3,683–87 (1996), Congressional Review Title of H.R. 3136,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1996-04-18/html/CREC-1996-04-18-pt1PgS3683.htm [https://perma.cc/L63V-LMK6].
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 313 F. Supp. 3d 976 (D. Alaska
2018), appeal filed, (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2018); James Goodwin, It’s Time to Repeal the
Congressional Review Act, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (May 2, 2018), http://www.pro
gressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=1DBA8FE9-B109-E5C5-D4D9F870826A5050
[https://perma.cc/K6XH-E7XN].
51. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2018) (noting, for example, “An amendment to, or a
motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a
motion to recommit the joint resolution is not in order.”).
52. Id.
53. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–02 (2018); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening the Congressional
Review Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 191 (2018) (“The Act does so by creating a
fast-track procedure that enables Congress to set aside any new rule it finds unwise before
the rule can go into effect.”).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).

2019]

THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT

359

allowing the rules to be struck down without delay.55 After the resolution’s
introduction, there must be a simple majority vote in both congressional
bodies for the joint resolution to pass. If the resolution passes, it is then
submitted to the president for approval.56 The president’s signature nullifies
the rule.57 Like other legislation, even if the president were to veto the joint
resolution of disapproval, a two-thirds majority vote in both chambers could
override the veto.58 Once a joint resolution of disapproval is passed, the
CRA bars federal agencies from reissuing rules that are “substantially the
same” as those that were struck down by the resolution.59
While the CRA provides Congress a veto power, it is only applicable
to “rules” as defined by the CRA.60 The CRA defines a “rule” as the
following:
The whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency
and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates,
wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances
therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing
on any of the foregoing.61
The CRA’s definition of “rule” essentially gives Congress the ability to
review every agency action passed.62 While the definition of “rule” under
the CRA is broad, it explicitly excludes rules which: (1) “approve[] or
prescribe[] for the future rates, wages, prices, services, or allowances
therefor, corporate or financial structures, reorganizations, mergers, or
acquisitions thereof, or accounting practices or disclosures bearing on any

55. See 5 U.S.C. § 802.
56. Daniel R. Perez, Congressional Review Act Fact Sheet, GEO. WASH. U. REG.
STUD. CTR. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/congressionalreview-act-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/BM6B-8RJH].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1–2).
60. 5 U.S.C. § 804(3).
61. Id. (deriving definition from 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)).
62. Larkin, Jr. supra note 53, at 207–08 (explaining that “the federal courts have made
clear that the term ‘rule’ must be construed broadly[,]” and “rule” as defined in the CRA is
“broad[] enough to include virtually every statement an agency may make . . . .” (quoting
Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 908 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation
omitted)).
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of the foregoing;”63 (2) relate to “agency management or personnel;”64 or (3)
relate to “any rule of agency organization, procedure, or practice that does
not substantially affect the rights or obligations of non-agency parties.”65
While the CRA does not create a timeframe in which an agency must
file its rule with Congress and the Comptroller General, it does provide that
the rule will not become effective until it has been submitted.66 Generally,
Congress has sixty legislative days from the time the rule is submitted to it
and published in the Federal Register to determine whether it will vote down
the rule.67 Moreover, a CRA resolution cannot be filibustered, which is the
only reason Republicans were able to rescind sixteen regulations during
early days of the Trump Administration.68 It is unlikely that Republicans
could have garnered sixty votes in the Senate for any of the measures.
Admittedly, some critics suggest that CRA resolutions impermissibly
tip the balance of future regulation toward Congress because the regulation
“may not be reissued in substantially the same form.”69 The reasons for
including this restriction are somewhat apparent. Without it, agencies may
be tempted to engage in administrative “whack-a-mole” with hopes that the
political winds will have changed by the time the agency has churned out a
new, but functionally identical rule. The CRA’s sponsors were clear: the
language barring similar rules was designed “to prevent circumvention of a
resolution [of] disapproval.”70
There is an argument that this provision unconstitutionally binds future
executives. Yet, so does passing a “normal” law to overturn agency action.
Where a “normal” law is passed to overturn an agency action, it takes a law
passed under the traditional process to rescind previous legislation (in most
circumstances).71 Under the CRA, if a future congress and president were to
63. 5 U.S.C. § 804(3)(A).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 804(3)(B).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 804(3)(C).
66. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(2)(A). However, if a rule is submitted less than sixty legislative
session days before it adjourns its final session, a new period of review becomes available to
the incoming sessions of Congress. 5 U.S.C. § 801(d)(1)(B).
68. See House Republican Conf., supra note 4.
69. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (“[A] new rule that is substantially the same as such a rule [that
does not take effect] may not be issued, unless the reissued or new rule is specifically
authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the
original rule.”).
70. See 142 Cong. Rec. 3,683–87, supra note 46.
71. Mark Strand & Tim Lang, Rescissions, Rescissions: How Congress Can Use the
Rescission Process Responsibly, CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTE, https://www.conginst.org/20
18/05/17/rescissions-rescissions-how-congress-can-use-the-rescission-process-responsibly/
[https://perma.cc/DEJ3-GSZK].
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take action in an area where Congress used the CRA to strike down a prior
rule, passing a new law granting the agency additional jurisdiction is all that
is required.
Although not directly addressed in the legislative history, the CRA is
often regarded as a tool of the legislative branch to check the executive.72
While this is true, it is only an effective check when the president is
supportive. Indeed, this article likely would not have been written if former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had won the presidency and Congress had
remained under Republican control. She likely would have vetoed every
resolution, and there would have been less attention on fruitless attempts to
overturn regulation. There is no doubt President Trump was eager to sign
resolutions of disapproval.73 Before he even took office, conservatives in the
transition team were circulating potential lame duck rules eligible for CRA
repeal.74

C.

Infancy of CRA: 1996 to 2001

Since the CRA’s enactment, there have been more than two hundred
resolutions of disapproval introduced in the House and Senate.75 The
72. Dylan Scott, The New Republican Plan to Deregulate America, Explained,
VOX, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/25/17275566/congressional-reviewact-what-regulations-has-trump-cut [https://perma.cc/95PW-YT2A] (“[t]he primary goal
here is to hold the executive branch accountable . . . .”).
73. Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Obama’s Midnight Regulations to Get Increased
Scrutiny from Congress and Trump, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/20
16/11/16/obamas-midnight-regulations-to-get-increased-scrutiny-from-congress-and-trump/
[https://perma.cc/9BYS-E22L].
74. Id. In the months leading up to, and after, the election of 2016, I was contacted by
members of Congress to generate a list of regulations eligible for repeal under the CRA. In
addition, members of the transition team contacted me about providing a list of rules eligible
for repeal.
75. Thirty-four resolutions disapproving of agency rules were introduced during the
114th Congress, while eighty-nine were introduced during the 115th Congress. S.J. Res. 8,
114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 29, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 152, 114th Cong. (2015);
H.R.J. Res. 42, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 14, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 59, 114th
Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 408, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 22, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J.
Res. 67, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 68, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 70, 114th
Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 72, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 24, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res.
23, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 71, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 25, 114th Cong. (2015);
H.R.J. Res. 74, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 539, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 27, 114th
Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 28, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 583, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J.
Res. 87, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 33, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 88, 114th Cong.
(2016); H.R. Res. 706, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 34, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 35,
114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 95, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. Res. 836, 114th Cong. (2016);
S.J. Res. 38, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 37, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. Res. 921, 114th
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majority of resolutions have been introduced in just the past five years.76
While there was little action during the CRA’s infancy,77 there was significant
political activity from both Democrats and Republicans.78 Shortly after the
CRA’s passage, there was recognition from both parties that an onerous

Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 107, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 108, 114th Cong. (2016);
H.R.J. Res. 11, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 16, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 22,
115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 35, 115th Cong. (2017);
H.R. Res. 71, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 70, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 38, 115th
Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 42, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 47, 115th
Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 37, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 39, 115th Cong.
(2017); S.J. Res. 12, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 45, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res.
41, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 40, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); S.J. Res.
10, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 36, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 46, 115th Cong.
(2017); S.J. Res. 15, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 44, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted);
H.R.J. Res. 43, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); S.J. Res. 9, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 14,
115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 11, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 13, 115th Cong. (2017);
H.R.J. Res. 49, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 74, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 52, 115th
Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 55, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 54, 115th Cong. (2017);
H.R.J. Res. 58, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J.
Res. 59, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 56, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 19, 115th Cong.
(2017); S.J. Res. 18, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 60, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 21,
115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 62, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 91, 115th Cong. (2017);
H.R. Res. 99, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 66, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res.
67, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 69, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res.
68, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 70, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 116, 115th Cong.
(2017); H.R.J. Res. 71, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 123, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res.
73, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 23, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 77, 115th Cong. (2017);
H.R.J. Res. 82, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 83, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R. Res.
150, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 25, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 84, 115th Cong.
(2017); S.J. Res. 26, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 27, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 28, 115th
Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 29, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 32, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res.
33, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); H.R.J. Res. 86, 115th
Cong. (2017); S.J. Res. 37, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 87, 115th Cong. (2017); S.J. Res.
38, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 230, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 97, 115th Cong.
(2017); H.R.J. Res. 96, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 103, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J.
Res. 111, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); S.J. Res. 47, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. Res. 468,
115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 122, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.J. Res. 129, 115th Cong.
(2018); S.J. Res. 52, 115th Cong. (2018); S.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted); S.J. Res.
56, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R.J. Res. 131, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R.J. Res. 132, 115th Cong.
(2018); H.R. Res. 873, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. Res. 872, 115th Cong. (2018); S.J. Res. 63,
115th Cong. (2018); H.R.J. Res. 140, 115th Cong. (2018); S.J. Res. 64, 115th Cong. (2018);
H.R.J. Res. 145, 115th Cong. (2018).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Supra note 75.
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regulation could offend local constituencies enough to force a CRA
resolution.79
In the CRA’s first year, there were only two resolutions of
disapproval.80 Only one made it to a Senate vote, but it eventually failed.81
The measure, introduced by Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), attempted to
rescind a rule from the Department of Health and Human Services relating
to Medicare reimbursement rates.82
By the next Congress (1997–1998), there were a total of six resolutions
introduced—or roughly six percent of the volume from 2017.83 It is clear
Congress was still learning to use the CRA. None of these measures made
it to a vote in either chamber.84 At this point in the CRA’s existence, it was
solely used as a partisan tool to check the opposing party in the White
House.
In 1999, there was only one resolution of disapproval introduced.85 In
2000, there were four resolutions and the first Democratic attempt to
rescind a regulation.86 On July 18, 2000, Representative Marion Berry (DAR) introduced a resolution of disapproval to rescind an Environmental
Protection Agency measure implementing the Clean Water Act.87 The joint
resolution garnered twenty-three cosponsors, but never made it to the
House floor.88 Likewise, the three other CRA resolutions never garnered a
79. Id.
80. H.R.J. Res. 178, 104th Cong. (1996) (declaring that certain rules submitted by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regarding the promotion of wholesale competition
and stranded cost recovery shall have no force or effect); S.J. Res. 60, 104th Cong. (1996)
(disapproving of a rule submitted by the Health Care Financing Administration relating to
hospital reimbursement under Medicare).
81. Compare H.R.J. Res. 178, 104th Cong. (1996) (disapproving Orders Nos. 888 and
889 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), with S.J. Res. 60, 104th Cong. (1996)
(disapproving of a rule submitted by the Health Care Financing Administration relating to
hospital reimbursement under Medicare).
82. See S.J. Res. 60, 104th Cong. (1996).
83. H.R.J. Res. 59, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.J. Res. 67, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.J.
Res. 81, 105th Cong. (1997); S.J. Res. 25, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R.J. Res. 123, 105th Cong.
(1998); S.J. Res. 50, 105th Cong. (1998).
84. See Id.
85. H.R.J. Res. 55, 106th Cong. (1999) (disapproving of a relating to delivery of mail
to a commercial mail receiving agency).
86. H.R.J. Res. 104, 106th Cong. (2000) (disapproving a rule relating to water quality
protections); S.J. Res. 50, 106th Cong. (2000) (disapproving a final rule concerning water
pollution); H.R.J. Res. 106, 106th Cong. (2000) (disapproving a final rule concerning water
pollution); H.R.J. Res. 105, 106th Cong. (2000) (disapproving relating to total maximum
daily loads under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
87. H.R.J. Res. 105, 106th Cong. (2000).
88. Id.
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vote. It is notable that—in addition to Representative Berry’s support to
overturn the EPA regulation—seven other Democrats joined in support.89
By the next Congress (2001–2002), legislators introduced as many
CRA resolutions as they had during the entire prior history of the law.90 The
timing made sense from a political perspective: Republicans still controlled
Congress, and an outgoing Democratic administration gave way to an
incoming Republican one. The CRA’s “carryover provision” allows the
incoming Congress to scrutinize the last several months of regulations from
the previous administration.91 Of the thirteen resolutions introduced, six
were introduced by Democrats to check new actions from the Bush
Administration.92 Given the conservative composition of Congress, none
made it to a floor vote.93
When Senator Don Nickles, one of the chief sponsors of the CRA in
1996, introduced a resolution of disapproval to overturn the Department of
Labor’s ergonomics rule, he made congressional history.94 Despite a fifty89. See H.R.J. Res. 105 supra note 87.
90. S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted); H.R. Res. 79, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J.
Res. 35, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 38, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 9, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R.J. Res. 44, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 43, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res.
14, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 15, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 17, 107th Cong. (2001);
H.R. Res. 414, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 92, 107th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 37, 107th
Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 119, 107th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 48, 107th Cong. (2002).
91. RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31160, DISAPPROVAL OF
REGULATIONS BY CONGRESS: PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT 1–3
(2001)
(discussing
the CRA’s disapproval procedures), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31160.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5222-EQLH]; CURTIS W. COPELAND & RICHARD S. BETH, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL34633, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: DISAPPROVAL OF RULES IN A
SUBSEQUENT SESSION OF CONGRESS (2008) (discussing the “carryover” procedures),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34633.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U42-FW5Y].
92. S.J. Res. 9, 107th Cong. (2001) (disapproving a rule submitted by the President
regarding the restoration of the Mexico City Policy); S.J. Res. 14, 107th Cong. (2001)
(disapproving a rule regarding the delay in the effective date of a new arsenic standard); S.J.
Res. 15, 107th Cong. (2001) (disapproving a rule regarding the postponement of the effective
date of energy conservation standards for central air conditioners); S.J. Res. 17, 107th Cong.
(2001) (disapproving a rule submitted by the President regarding the restoration of the
Mexico City Policy); H.R.J. Res. 92, 107th Cong. (2002) (disapproving a rule regarding
modification of the Medicaid upper payment limit for non-State government owned or
operated hospitals); S.J. Res. 37, 107th Cong. (2002) (disapproving a rule regarding
modification of the Medicaid upper payment limit for non-State government owned or
operated hospitals).
93. See 107th Congress (2001-2003), U.S. HOUSE REPS., OFF. ART & ARCHIVES,
https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/107th/ [https://perma.cc/S838AEKZ].
94. See S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001).
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fifty partisan split in the Senate, the resolution managed fifty-six votes in the
Senate, including all Republicans and six Democrats.95 The vote also put the
CRA’s streamlined procedures on full display: without the CRA’s filibuster
preclusion, the vote to rescind never would have passed. During the debate,
Senator Asa Hutchinson (R-AR) made his colleagues’ intent clear:
With the CRA, we have a means by which we can address an
agency that goes amok and passes a rule that is not in the interest
of the American people. . . . For the first time ever, the Senate
will today utilize the CRA to vitiate and overturn an agency rule—
that is, a several-hundred-page OSHA rule—that imposes the
largest and most costly regulatory mandate in American history
on the workplace. It is appropriate that this would be the first use
for the CRA.96
The next day, the House quickly followed suit and voted (223-206) to
overturn the ergonomics rule.97 Although sixteen Democrats and one
Independent voted to overturn the Clinton-era rule, thirteen Republicans
declined to support the disapproval resolution.98 During the House debate,
Congressman John Boehner (R-OH), then Chair of the House Education
and Workforce Committee, made a prophetic comment on future rules
under the CRA.99 He noted, “[a]gain, no one is opposed to providing
appropriate ergonomics protections in the workplace. The Secretary of
Labor has indicated her intent to pursue a comprehensive approach to
ergonomics protections. I look forward to working with her and my
colleagues on such an effort.”100
The Bush Administration never pursued a new ergonomics rule, and
there is evidence that legal uncertainty around the “substantially the same
form” language in the CRA scared off future regulators from revisiting the
ergonomics rule.101
The CRA’s first few years were marked with a relative paucity of
disapproval resolutions. However, the “perfect timing” of a Republican
administration replacing a Democratic administration—with a friendly
Congress—led to the first use of the CRA roughly five years after its

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

S. Roll Call Vote No. 15, 107th Cong. (2001).
Id. at 1847.
H.R. Roll Call Vote No. 33, 107th Cong. (2001).

Id.
147 CONG. REC. 29, 685 (2001).

Id.
See, e.g., Adam M. Finkel & Jason W. Sullivan, A Cost-Benefit Interpretation of
the “Substantially Similar” Hurdle in the Congressional Review Act: Can OSHA Ever Utter
the E-Word (Ergonomics) Again?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 707 (2011).
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passage.102 The legislative veto was back, if even only for an instant. It is likely
there were no more resolutions because of the slim Republican majorities.
Yet, unlike in 2001, that did not stop Republicans in 2017.

D. Slow Weaponization of CRA: 2002–2015
After Congress and the Bush Administration struck down the
ergonomics rule, the CRA was somewhat dormant. Republicans had few
incentives to defy the Bush Administration, and Democrats were not overly
aggressive in their attempts to challenge his regulations especially since they
did not control Congress until 2007.
Despite this relative lull, there were thirty-nine CRA resolutions
introduced between 2001 and 2009, for an average of four or five each
year.103 There was no new resolution introduced in 2006, leading up to the
midterm elections.104 To an extent, the CRA’s bipartisan use dispels the
102. Id. at 725–27.
103. S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted); H.R. Res. 79, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J.
Res. 35, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 38, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 9, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R.J. Res. 44, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 43, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res.
14, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 15, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 17, 107th Cong. (2001);
H.R. Res. 414, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 92, 107th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 37, 107th
Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 119, 107th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 48, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R.J.
Res. 3, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 41, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 58, 108th Cong.
(2003); S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 72, 108th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res. 32,
108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 31, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 4, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.J.
Res. 23, 109th Cong. (2005); S.J. Res. 20, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.J. Res. 56, 109th Cong.
(2005); H.R.J. Res. 47, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 49, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res.
18, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 51, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 54, 110th Cong.
(2007); H.R.J. Res. 55, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 20, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 22,
110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 28, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R.J. Res. 79, 110th Cong. (2008);
H.R.J. Res. 78, 110th Cong. (2008); S.J. Res. 30, 110th Cong. (2008); S.J. Res. 44, 110th
Cong. (2008).
104. S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted); H.R. Res. 79, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J.
Res. 35, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 38, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 9, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R.J. Res. 44, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R.J. Res. 43, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res.
14, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 15, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 17, 107th Cong. (2001);
H.R. Res. 414, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 92, 107th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 37, 107th
Cong. (2002); H.R.J. Res. 119, 107th Cong. (2002); S.J. Res. 48, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R.J.
Res. 3, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 41, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 58, 108th Cong.
(2003); S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.J. Res. 72, 108th Cong. (2003); S.J. Res. 32,
108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 31, 108th Cong. (2004); S.J. Res. 4, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.J.
Res. 23, 109th Cong. (2005); S.J. Res. 20, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.J. Res. 56, 109th Cong.
(2005); H.R.J. Res. 47, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 49, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res.
18, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 51, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 54, 110th Cong.
(2007); H.R.J. Res. 55, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 20, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 22,
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notion that is a purely partisan Republican tool to strike down “onerous”
regulations.
There were numerous Bush Administration actions to which
Democrats objected. For example, Representative Lane Evans (D-IL)
introduced a measure to rescind a Department of Veterans Affairs’ health
care rule.105 Likewise, both Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) and
Representative Maurice Hinchey (D-NY) introduced a CRA resolution to
overturn the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) new media
ownership rules.106 Senator Dorgan’s resolution even passed the Republicancontrolled Senate with fifty-five votes.107 Notably, twelve Republicans
supported the measure in the Senate, including former Senate Majority
Leader Trent Lott (R-MS).108 During recent CRA votes, few Democrats
supported CRA resolutions to overturn a regulation promulgated by their
own party.109 To many, there was bipartisan opposition to FCC’s new rule,
and Congress (at least one chamber) objected strenuously enough to seek
to rescind it.110 Few in Congress at the time wanted to abolish the CRA,
knowing how close they were to achieving their own policy ends, vis a vis
rescinding FCC’s rule.111
By the next Congress (2005–2006), Democrats managed to get two
CRA resolutions onto the Senate floor, but none in the House.112 Both of
the resolutions were introduced by Democrats; one—introduced by Senator
Kent Conrad (D-ND)—successfully passed the Senate.113 It would have
overturned the Department of Agriculture rule on “Mad Cow Disease” risk
110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 28, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R.J. Res. 79, 110th Cong. (2008);
H.R.J. Res. 78, 110th Cong. (2008); S.J. Res. 30, 110th Cong. (2008); S.J. Res. 44, 110th
Cong. (2008).
105. See H.R.J. Res. 41, 108th Cong. (2003).
106. See S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003). Although the FCC is an independent agency,
and not technically part of the Bush Administration, President Bush had appointed a
majority of the commissioners. See, e.g., Pamela McClintock, Bush
Naming Names in D.C., VARIETY (Apr. 9, 2001), https://variety.com/2001/biz/news/bushnaming-names-in-d-c-1117796745/ [https://perma.cc/T8F8-JYAM].
107. S. Roll Call Vote No. 348, 108th Cong. (2003).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., H.R. Roll Call Vote No. 73, 115th Cong. (2017) (showing that there were
only four Democrats in the U.S. House that supported the resolution to overturn the
Department of Interior’s Stream Protection Rule).
110. Ben Scott, The Politics and Policy of Media Ownership, 53 AM. UNIV. L. REV.
645, 646–47 (2004).
111. See id. at 664–65.
112. Compare S.J. Res. 4, 109th Cong. (2005); S.J. Res. 20, 109th Cong. (2005), with
H.R.J. Res. 23, 109th Cong. (2005), and H.R.J. Res. 56, 109th Cong. (2005).
113. S.J. Res. 4, 109th Cong. (2005); see S. Roll Call Vote No. 19, 109th Cong. (2005).
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zones.114 Opposition was not particularly strong in the Senate, as the CRA
measure garnered just fifty-two votes, but eleven Republicans were upset
enough, voting to rescind the regulation.115 The CRA measure that failed the
Senate, introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), would have repealed
an EPA measure “to delist coal and oil-direct utility units from the source
category list under the Clean Air Act.”116 Despite the relatively partisan
nature of the forty-seven to fifty-one vote against repeal, nine Republicans
still voted for Senator Leahy’s joint resolution.117 A freshman Democrat also
voted to repeal the EPA rule: then-Senator Barack Obama (D-IL).118
The intentions of the vote to overturn were clear: the Bush
Administration was attempting to degrade air quality. As Senator Frank
Lautenberg (D-NJ) noted, “I suspect most Americans are going to be
shocked to learn the administration wants to allow more poisonous mercury
into the environment. But that is exactly what they are trying to do.”119 Again,
it makes little sense for either party to voluntary cede legislative veto
authority under the CRA. In this instance, Democrats, and many proenvironment Republicans, objected to a rule they thought would harm air
quality. They had the power to rescind the rule and nearly succeeded in the
Senate.120 If these examples of Democrats objecting to regulations during the
Bush Administration are evidence of anything, it is that Congress can have
a legitimate policy objection to a regulation and not be “anti-regulation.”
By the last Congress of the Bush Administration (2007-2008), the story
was mostly the same: Democrats continued to object to President Bush’s
domestic policy regulations. Of the thirteen measures introduced during
this time, Democrats sponsored all of them, and one managed to pass
through the Senate.121 Strangely, there was another push to overturn an FCC
rule, and it passed by voice vote in the Democratic Senate.122 Yet, the House

114. S.J. Res. 4, 109th Cong. (2005).
115. S. Roll Call Vote No. 19, 109th Cong. (2005).
116. See S.J. Res. 20, 109th Cong. (2005).
117. S. Roll Call Vote No. 225, 109th Cong. (2005).
118. Id.
119. 151 CONG. REC. 9, 955–58, (2005).
120. See S. Roll Call Vote No. 19, supra note 115.
121. Introduced: H.R.J. Res. 47, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 49, 110th Cong.
(2007); S.J. Res. 18, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 51, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res.
54, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 55, 110th Cong. (2007); S.J. Res. 20, 110th Cong. (2007);
S.J. Res. 22, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.J. Res. 79, 110th Cong. (2008); H.R.J. Res. 78, 110th
Cong. (2008); S.J. Res. 30, 110th Cong. (2008); S.J. Res. 44, 110th Cong. (2008). Introduced
and Passed Senate: S.J. Res. 28, 110th Cong. (2008).
122. See S.J. Res. 28, 110th Cong. (2008).
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never took up the matter beyond initial introduction.123 This all happened
during the middle of a presidential election year with a financial crisis to
follow that fall, so opponents of the rule might forgive Congress for turning
to other matters.
By the time President Obama took office in January 2009, the partisan
switch had largely flipped on the CRA. Although there were a few
Democrats sponsoring resolutions to overturn regulations, they were
objecting to independent agency actions of appointees from President Bush,
not the Obama Administration.124 However, EPA’s actions to begin
regulating carbon dioxide drew the ire of several “coal state” Democrats.
For example, Representative Ike Shelton (D-MO) introduced a disapproval
resolution following EPA’s “endangerment finding,” a regulation that
essentially started the process of federal greenhouse gas regulation
(GHG).125 He was joined by fifty-two other cosponsors, including twenty-six
Democrats.126
By the 112th Congress (2011-2012), legislators began to employ the
CRA far more often. The 112th Congress set a record for the number of
CRA resolutions introduced: twenty-five.127
Republicans introduced all of these resolutions.128 However, without
control of the Senate, none passed the upper chamber and only two passed
123. See H.R. J. Res. 79, 110th Cong. (2008).
124. See S.J. Res. 23, 111th Cong. (2009).
125. See H.R. J. Res. 76, 111th Cong. (2010).
126. Id.
127. Congress managed to introduce twenty-five resolutions during the 112th Congress,
compared to just eight resolutions from the prior Congress. Compare H.R.J. Res. 9, 112th
Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 19, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 21, 112th Cong. (2011);
H.R.J. Res. 37, 112th Cong. (2011); S.J. Res. 6, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 42, 112th
Cong. (2011); H.R. Res. 200, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 59, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J.
Res. 61, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 58, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 60, 112th
Cong. (2011); S.J. Res. 27, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 85, 112th Cong. (2011); S.J. Res.
37, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 36, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 103, 112th Cong.
(2012); H.R.J. Res. 104, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 38, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res.
108, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 40, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 112, 112th Cong.
(2012); H.R.J. Res. 113, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 46, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 48,
112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 118, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 50, 112th Cong. (2012);
H.R. Res. 788, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 51, 112th Cong. (2012), with H.R.J. Res. 18,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R.J. Res. 65, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R.J. Res. 66, 111th Cong. (2009);
S.J. Res. 23, 111th Cong. (2009); S.J. Res. 24, 111th Cong. (2009); S.J. Res. 26, 111th Cong.
(2010); H.R.J. Res. 76, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. Res. 77, 111th Cong. (2010); S.J. Res.
30, 111th Cong. (2010); S.J. Res. 39, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. Res. 97, 111th Cong. (2010);
H.R.J. Res. 100, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. Res. 103, 111th Cong. (2010).
128. See H.R.J. Res. 9, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 19, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J.
Res. 21, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 37, 112th Cong. (2011); S.J. Res. 6, 112th Cong.
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the House.129 Republicans might have felt emboldened to introduce a record
number of disapproval resolutions, but they did so with the hopes of a
Republican president in 2013. They were denied that on Election Day and
CRA activity dropped off considerably.130
From 2013-2014, there were only nine new CRA resolutions, the
lowest figure since the 109th Congress (2005-2006).131 Again, without control
of the Senate, no resolution stood the chance of passing Congress and
arriving on President Obama’s desk. There were ten resolutions
introduced, but they went nowhere in either congressional chamber.132 As
previewed by EPA’s earlier endangerment finding, the agency’s rule to
finally regulate GHG emissions from power plants drew a CRA resolution
in both the House and Senate.133 The House resolution garnered fifty-six
cosponsors and the Senate measure had forty-one—enough to discharge the
measure to the floor, but there was never a vote.134

(2011); H.R.J. Res. 42, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. Res. 200, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res.
59, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 61, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res. 58, 112th Cong.
(2011); H.R.J. Res. 60, 112th Cong. (2011); S.J. Res. 27, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.J. Res.
85, 112th Cong. (2011); S.J. Res. 37, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 36, 112th Cong. (2012);
H.R.J. Res. 103, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 104, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 38,
112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 108, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 40, 112th Cong. (2012);
H.R.J. Res. 112, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 113, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 46,
112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 48, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 118, 112th Cong. (2012);
S.J. Res. 50, 112th Cong. (2012); H.R. Res. 788, 112th Cong. (2012); S.J. Res. 51, 112th
Cong. (2012); H.R.J. Res. 18, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R.J. Res. 65, 111th Cong. (2009);
H.R.J. Res. 66, 111th Cong. (2009); S.J. Res. 23, 111th Cong. (2009); S.J. Res. 24, 111th
Cong. (2009); S.J. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. Res. 76, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J.
Res. 77, 111th Cong. (2010); S.J. Res. 30, 111th Cong. (2010); S.J. Res. 39, 111th Cong.
(2010); H.R.J. Res. 97, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. Res. 100, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J.
Res. 103, 111th Cong. (2010).
129. H.R. J. Res. 37, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. J. Res. 118, 112th Cong. (2012).
130. See David A. Foretold, Obama Reelected as President, WASH. POST (Nov. 7,
2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/after-grueling-campaignpolls-open-for-election-day-2012/2012/11/06/d1c24c98-2802-11e2-b4e0346287b7e56c_story.html [https://perma.cc/QN5B-NEFC].
131. S.J. Res. 8, 113th Cong. (2013); S.J. Res. 9, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R.J. Res. 63,
113th Cong. (2013); H.R.J. Res. 64, 113th Cong. (2013); S.J. Res. 27, 113th Cong. (2013);
H.R. Res. 425, 113th Cong. (2014); S.J. Res. 30, 113th Cong. (2014); S.J. Res. 35, 113th
Cong. (2014); H.R.J. Res. 118, 113th Cong. (2014).
132. S.J. Res. 8, 113th Cong. (2013); S.J. Res. 9, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R.J. Res. 63,
113th Cong. (2013); H.R.J. Res. 64, 113th Cong. (2013); S.J. Res. 27, 113th Cong. (2013);
H.R. Res. 425, 113th Cong. (2014); S.J. Res. 30, 113th Cong. (2014); S.J. Res. 35, 113th
Cong. (2014); H.R.J. Res. 118, 113th Cong. (2014).
133. See S.J. Res. 30, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. J. Res. 64, 113th Cong. (2013).
134. S.J. Res. 30, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R. J. Res. 64, 113th Cong. (2013).
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During this period, Congress gradually remembered the power it
carved out back in 1996 and began using it to address onerous regulations.
However, it was not until the lead up to the 2016 Election (the so-called
“midnight” year for regulation) during which CRA activity peaked to record
levels, delivering historic results for conservatives.135
III. CONGRESS DISCOVERS CHECKS AND BALANCES
It is not as though Congress forgot about its ability to check the
executive since passage of the CRA; it is just that, absent one occasion, for
twenty years it never did.136 This was largely due to the confluence of factors
around a transition of power between one party in the White House and
the other—in addition to needing a Congress with a long memory, ready to
object to regulations from the previous year. Yet, Republicans only
employed the CRA once in 2001 and Democrats never employed it
successfully in 2009, even though their majorities afforded some flexibility.137
For Republicans going into 2016, they foresaw the perfect opportunity and
devised a plan to employ the CRA more frequently.

A.

Seeds of Trump Administration Push

The volume of regulations promulgated in the late stages of the Obama
Administration provided ample fodder for Republicans in the House and
Senate. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
federal regulators issued 119 major rules in 2016, shattering the previous
record of 100 major rules in 2010.138 For comparison, President Bush issued
fifty-one major rules during his first midterm year (2002) and ninety-five (the
previous record) in 2008.139
Republicans began their push during the 114th Congress (2015-2016)
with thirty-four CRA resolutions, breaking their previous record of twentyeight.140 However, the distinguishing feature about this CRA push was that
135. See Pierre Lemieux, Obama’s Record-Setting Midnight, REG. MAG. (2017),
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2017/3/regulation-v40n18_1.pdf#page=4 [https://perma.cc/4N68-28LE].
136. S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted) (disapproving rule submitted by the
Department of Labor relating to ergonomics).
137. Id.
138. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DATABASE OF RULES,
https://www.gao.gov/legal/other-legal-work/congressional-review-act?fedRuleSearch
[https://perma.cc/PX2X-KDK7].
139. See id.
140. S.J. Res. 8, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 29, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 152,
114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 42, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 14, 114th Cong. (2015);
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five resolutions wound up on President Obama’s desk.141 As expected, he
vetoed all of them, but for Republicans, delivering the message mattered.142
The floor debates were essential and forcing vulnerable Democrats to take
votes on controversial regulations was key. No president had ever vetoed a
CRA resolution since the legislation’s passage in 1996.143 When President
Obama halted the attempted repeal of the National Labor Relations
Board’s representation case procedures rule on March 31, 2015, he was
likely unaware Republicans would pass four more resolutions to send his
way.144
The 2015-2016 CRA resolutions were destined to fail and Republicans
knew it. President Obama was not going to nullify his administration’s work.
For Republicans, the CRA was starting to become a regular part of oversight;
they had successfully established a framework for scrutiny—and more
importantly—they had majorities for overturning “onerous” regulations. All
that was needed was a new Republican president who would sign their CRA
resolutions.
H.R.J. Res. 59, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 408, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 22, 114th
Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 67, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 68, 114th Cong. (2015);
H.R.J. Res. 70, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 72, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 24, 114th
Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 23, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 71, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res.
25, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R.J. Res. 74, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 539, 114th Cong.
(2015); S.J. Res. 27, 114th Cong. (2015); S.J. Res. 28, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. Res. 583,
114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 87, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 33, 114th Cong. (2016);
H.R.J. Res. 88, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. Res. 706, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 34, 114th
Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 35, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 95, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.
Res. 836, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 38, 114th Cong. (2016); S.J. Res. 37, 114th Cong.
(2016); H.R. Res. 921, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res. 107, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R.J. Res.
108, 114th Cong. (2016).
141. S.J. Res. 8, 114th Cong. (2015) (disapproving rule submitted by the National Labor
Relations Board relating to representation case procedures); S.J. Res. 22, 114th Cong. (2015)
(disapproving rule regarding the definition of “waters of the United States” under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act); S.J. Res. 24, 114th Cong. (2015) (disapproving rule submitted
regarding “Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units”); S.J. Res. 23, 114th Cong. (2015) (disapproving a rule regarding
“Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New, Modified, and
Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units”); H.R.J. Res. 88, 114th
Cong. (2016) (disapproving rule submitted by the Department of Labor regarding the
definition of the term “Fiduciary”).
142. Joint Resolution of Disapproval, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Joint_resolution_of_disapproval_(administrative_state)#cite_notesmithsonian-6 [https://perma.cc/PLN9-AXW8].
143. Jason Daley, What is the Congressional Review Act?, Smithsonian (Feb. 10,
2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/what-congressional-review-act180962031/ [https://perma.cc/W9BH-U2L3].
144. See S.J. Res. 8, 114th Cong. (2015).
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The CRA in 2017-2018

President Obama and the Electoral College created a confluence of
perfect circumstances for Republicans. The Obama Administration
managed to churn out 119 major rules in 2016.145 Consider the regulatory
output at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in
December of 2016; it managed to conclude reviews of ninety-nine
regulations that month—the most since December 1993.146
Leading up to the 2016 election, conservative policymakers started to
gather a list of potential rules that then-presidential-candidate Donald
Trump could help nullify following his election.147 When he won in
November, his transition team sat down with House and Senate leaders to
arrive at a consensus regarding a set of rules that could likely garner
majorities in both congressional bodies.148 Outside of these private
conversations, many speculated that President Trump would eventually sign
between eight and twelve successful CRA measures.149 There were few
public predictions for the actual number: sixteen.150 But even that number
has an asterisk because of new developments in Congress with the CRA.151
In the end, the actual list of regulations overturned contained a few
notable regulations in the energy and environmental world, but there were
also rules few had ever heard of before, including many regulatory policy
practitioners. The final list of disapproved rules, from a record seventy-three
resolutions of disapproval introduced, contained sixteen regulations (250
percent more than the record from 2015-2016).152

145. See Lemieux, supra note 135, at 6.
146. See Executive Order Search Results, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoAdvancedSearch
[https://perma.cc/M7AC-N6A5]
(searching Dec. 1, 2016, through Dec. 31, 2016).
147. See Lemieux, supra note 135, at 6–7.
148. The author personally discussed the issue with House and Senate staff. In
December 2016, House and Senate leaders huddled with the transition team to determine
which rules could pass both Houses of Congress.
149. This was based on personal conversations with Washington-based regulatory policy
scholars. Some predicted only one or two regulations would be repealed, but others
predicted a mid-range of roughly eight to twelve.
150. Steven Dinan, GOP Rolled Back 14 of 15 Obama Rules Using Congressional
Review Act, WASH. TIMES, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/15/goprolled-back-14-of-15-obama-rules-using-congress/ [https://perma.cc/YM5E-K6MF].
151. Susan E. Dudley, We Haven’t Seen the Last of the CRA Yet, FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/susandudley/2017/10/31/we-havent-seen-the-last-of-the-crayet/ [https://perma.cc/JMF5-42WY].
152. See Erin Kelly, Republicans Seek Quick Repeal of Latest Obama
Administration Regulations, USA Today, (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
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The number of resolutions certainly stands out because some
questioned whether President Trump would be able to sign more than one
or two CRA resolutions.153 However, the most surprising development is
that the list included four major rules.154 The CRA provides that a major rule
is one that: (1) has an economic impact of $100 million; (2) will have a
significant increase in prices for consumers; or (3) will have adverse impacts
on competition or employment.155
The penultimate rule on the list—CFPB’s arbitration rule—was actually
not a product of the Obama Administration.156 It was published on July 19,
2017, with costs exceeding $370 million, and was a product of a federal
agency many Republicans wanted to repeal, along with an Obama appointee
running the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.157 Had former CFPB
Director Richard Cordray continued to serve, Republicans likely would
have continued to use the CRA to rescind every controversial regulation he
helped to promulgate.
In the end, the 2017-2018 CRA period easily broke records for
number of resolutions introduced (seventy-three), number of rules
rescinded (sixteen), and number of resolutions to pass a chamber
(eighteen).158 More importantly than the volume of resolutions passed, was
the change in behavior. All of Congress, including Democrats, now
routinely use the CRA to check executive power. The CRA has been

news/politics/elections/2016/11/15/republicans-seek-quick-repeal-latest-obamaadministration-regulations/93810344/ [https://perma.cc/H3CE-AGB5].
153. See id.
154. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MAJOR RULE REPORT ON ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686499.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9Q7P8Z5]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MAJOR RULE REPORT ON
ACCOUNTABILITY AND STATE PLANS (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/682020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2QU-BPVC]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MAJOR RULE
REPORT
ON PAYMENTS BY RESOURCE EXTRACTION ISSUERS (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680
/679328.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7YD-K5JX]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MAJOR
RULE REPORT ON FAIR PAY AND SAFE WORKPLACES (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/6
80/679982.pdf [https://perma.cc/26E5-ZY7T].
155. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (1996).
156. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33, 210 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1040).
157. Id.
158. See Jenna Lewinstein, A Brief History of Trump’s Use of the Congressional
Review Act, CLAREMONT J. L. & POL’Y (Mar. 30, 2018), https://5clpp.com/2018/03/30/abrief-history-of-trumps-use-of-the-congressional-review-act/
[https://perma.cc/XMQ4WZ6S].
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institutionalized as not just a deregulatory tool, but the legislative veto 2.0
that each party can wield to rein in a president.
After the public attention the CRA received recently, the law is no
longer a forgotten legislative tool. It is a part of Congress’ toolkit, just like
appropriations riders or oversight hearings. The CRA’s use might ebb yearto-year, but both parties will find it useful when confronted with regulations
they find truly odious.
IV. FROM REGULATORY CUDGEL TO BIPARTISAN WEAPON
There is little doubt the CRA was used as a deregulatory weapon by
Republicans during the early years of Trump Administration.159 However,
these deregulatory impulses are often bipartisan. In some instances, the
CRA can overturn regulations that are deregulatory in nature.160 As noted
above, Democrats frequently introduced CRA resolutions during the first
few years of the Bush Administration.161 However, naturally, there were few
reasons to introduce resolutions when President Obama took office. Yet,
conservative Democrats nevertheless challenged a few controversial EPA
regulations.162

A.

Progressive Conflict with CRA

Beginning in 2017, there was plenty of progressive angst within the
Democratic Party over the CRA.163 What had largely been a nuisance during
the Obama years now had the possibility to repeal several notable
regulations during the first few months of the Trump Administration.
Predictably, the CRA came under heavy scrutiny from progressive ranks.164
During the first few CRA votes of 2017, Democrats almost universally
opposed every CRA resolution put on the House and Senate floors.165 They
not only talked about the negative environmental and public health
consequences of rescinding regulations, but also about the long-term
159. “Because of senseless, onerous regulations like the [S]tream [P]rotection [R]ule,
the liberals in Washington have succeeded in putting most coal miners out of work.” 163
CONG. REC. H840–48 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2017) (statement of Rep. James Comer).
160. See S.J. Res. 52, 115th Cong. (2018) (aiming to nullify the FCC’s repeal of net
neutrality protection).
161. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003).
162. See, e.g., See H.R. J. Res. 76, 111th Cong. (2010).
163. See Goodwin, supra note 50.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., H. Roll Call Vote No. 202, 115th Cong. (2017) (voting to overturn the
FCC’s privacy rule received zero Democratic votes in the House and Senate; S.J. Res. 34);
S. Roll Call Vote No. 94, 115th Cong. (2017).
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consequences of the CRA.166 For example, during the debate over the
Department of Interior’s “Stream Protection Rule,” Representative Raúl
Grijalva remarked,
The use of the Congressional Review Act has been categorized as
reckless and extreme. . . . The CRA was going to cause significant
and lasting harm. If successful, two things are going to happen:
the regulation is void and the agency is prohibited from issuing
another similar rule ever again.167
Similarly, during the debate over the Stream Protection Rule in the
Senate, Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) noted, “[T]he Congressional
Review Act, is a particularly blunt instrument. The Congressional Review
Act allows the majority to rush a resolution of disapproval through the
Senate with limited debate and only a limited opportunity for Americans to
see what Congress is doing.”168 The definition of “rush” is, of course, subject
to varying interpretations as well. In the Senate, the CRA provides for up to
ten hours of debate, divided equally between the two sides.169 Senator Van
Hollen continued, “But a resolution of disapproval under the Congressional
Review Act does not just send a rule back to the drawing board. Instead, the
resolution repeals the rule and prohibits the Agency from ever proposing
anything like it again.”170
Again, for most of the debate, Democrats levied arguments for the rule
Congress was set to repeal and against the very function of the CRA.171 To
many progressives, the CRA would not just upend a rule, it would prevent
the agency—perhaps even one guided by progressive hands—from issuing a
replacement rule in the future because of the statute’s ‘substantially the
same” restrictions.172
What CRA critics do not mention, however, is that Congress—if it
really wanted to—could simply undo a resolution of disapproval.173 When
Democrats had strong majorities in Congress in 2009, they could have voted
to extended new authority to the Department of Labor to reissue an
ergonomics rule. However, they did not, and the legal uncertainty around
166. See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. H840–48 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 2017) (statement of Rep.
Dan Beyer) (“Most importantly, the Congressional Review Act doesn’t make sense here. If
you want to trim a tree, you don’t chop it down and bury it under cement so it will never
grow again.”).
167. Id.
168. See 163 CONG. REC. 611–32 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2017).
169. 5 U.S.C. § 802(d)(2).
170. See 163 CONG. REC., supra note 168, at 611–32.
171. See id.
172. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 101, at 710.
173. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
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the CRA likely limited the agency from attempting to reissue a new rule.174
Regardless, what Congress takes away with a resolution of disapproval, it can
restore by passing another law.175

B.

Senate Democrats Embraces the CRA

The CRA was created to curb “onerous” federal regulations. Yet, as
discussed above, that definition has different meanings to different political
parties. For example, just five days after FCC published a rule rescinding
net neutrality rules, 176 Democrats made net neutrality a voting issue in the
Senate when Senator Edward Markey (D-MA) introduced a resolution of
disapproval to rescind FCC’s rescission of open internet regulations.177 The
resolution of disapproval quickly garnered forty-eight cosponsors, far more
than the thirty required to generate a discharge petition under the CRA.178
By May 2018, there was a scheduled vote and it amassed fifty-two votes—
enough for passage under the CRA.179 No Democrat voted against the
measure and two Republicans joined them.180 To Senate Democrats and the
moderate Republicans who joined them, the CRA was actually a proregulatory tool that would ensure internet consumer protections. Given the
CRA’s general ability to strike down any regulation, including deregulatory
actions, it is a tool for Congress, not necessarily a deregulatory cudgel, as
detractors sometimes label the Act.
In the House, however, despite 169 cosponsors, Republican
leadership had no desire to buck the president and a conservative FCC.181
Although there might have been 200 votes for repeal, Republican leadership
would never let a repeal go to a vote unless there were 218 Members on the
resolution of disapproval. Although it did not pass, the net neutrality vote is
one of only thirty CRA resolutions to ever pass a chamber of Congress. The
FCC is an enticing target for progressives, as two other FCC rules were

174. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 101, at 729.
175. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (1996) (allowing for the passage of another law as long as
it is not in “substantially” the same form).
176. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MAJOR RULE REPORT ON RESTORING
INTERNET
FREEDOM (2018), https://www.gao.gov/products/D18805#mt=e-report
[https://perma.cc/J542-J4AT].
177. See S.J. Res. 52, 115th Cong. (2018).
178. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 802(c).
179. See Senate Roll Call Vote no. 97, 115th Cong. (May 16, 2018) (S.J. Res. 52,
115 Cong. (2018)), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.
cfm?congress=115&session=2&vote=00097 [https://perma.cc/Y3U3-B6FW].
180. Id.
181. See H.R.J. Res.129, 115th Cong. (2018).
th
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struck down in the Senate as well, but they all ultimately failed to gain steam
in the House.182
Implications of net neutrality repeal would have been broad had it
passed. It would have restored “Title II” internet protections for consumers
and content providers, but part of the original regulation included an
important “transparency rule” that policymakers on both sides of the aisle
supported.183 Given that a substantially similar new rule from FCC cannot
be issued, FCC would have been barred from issuing another transparency
provision?184 There will be an additional discussion of this below, but this is
just one reason why some wonder whether net neutrality will be a “zombie
regulation,” wandering “half alive and half dead” in regulatory purgatory.185
Congressional action will now be required to resolve these issues. Avoiding
such action may have been the original motivation of Democrats sponsoring
the resolution in the first place.186

1.

Progressives Challenge the CRA in Court

Discontent with the CRA may have reached its peak when the Center
for Biological Diversity sued the Trump Administration, arguing the CRA
was unconstitutional.187 Like the earlier legislative veto struck down in
Chadha, the plaintiffs argued the CRA violated both the bicameralism and
presentment requirements and the “Take Care” Clause in Article II of the
U.S. Constitution.188
Those contending the CRA’s constitutionality were dismissed at the
time; their survival hinged on the approval from both congressional
chambers and the president’s signature. After the Trump Administration
filed a motion to dismiss, the federal court agreed as well.189 Judge Sharon
L. Gleason wrote:
[G]iven that the CRA is itself a law passed by Congress pursuant
to the mechanisms outlined in the Constitution, [the plaintiff]
182.
183.

See id.
See Will Rinehart, The Congressional Review Act Might Not Fully Restore Net
Neutrality, Leaving It a Zombie Regulation, AM. ACTION F. (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/congressional-review-act-might-not-fullyrestore-net-neutrality-leaving-zombie-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/93HQ-CNJN].
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, 313 F. Supp. 3d 976 (D. Alaska 2018).
188. Id. at 980.
189. See Sam Batkins, No, the CRA Isn’t Unconstitutional, AM. ACTION F. (2018),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/no-cra-isnt-unconstitutional/
[https://perma.cc/ETW3-NUK7].
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does not adequately explain how the Take Care Clause mandates
that the executive branch should retain authority that Congress,
with Presidential approval, withdrew from it through [passage of
a joint resolution].190
A CRA resolution itself does not violate bicameralism and
presentment since it must pass both floors of Congress and get a presidential
signature.191 However, a creative plaintiff in this case argued that Congress
needed to amend the underlying statute, not vitiate a rule amending the
statute.192 The plaintiffs also argued that the “substantially the same form”
language in the CRA “creat[es] a large and unconstitutional shadow effect
that undermines Interior’s rulemaking authority.”193 This shadow effect is
obviously real, but only because no agency has ever tested it.
Suppose an agency, for example, reissues an ergonomics rule that is a
vastly scaled down version of its predecessor from 2001. If Congress does
not use the CRA to rescind it, does that mean it is substantially different?
Perhaps with technological changes and the passage of time, a rule must
necessarily be different after eighteen years. These are all questions an
executive could answer if it reissued a rule under the CRA—a move the CRA
does not bar but establishes parameters to ensure agencies do not reissue
the exact same rule to flout Congress.194
The plaintiffs went on to note that this effect violates the separation of
powers between Articles I and II.195 Judge Gleason dismissed this argument
as well, noting the CRA “was also passed by both houses of Congress and
signed into law by the President. Thus, the requirements of bicameralism
and presentment are met and [plaintiff’s] separation of powers concerns fail
to state a plausible claim for relief.”196
As a result of Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke, the CRA
appears safe from constitutional challenges for the near future. Yet, if
roughly eighteen years pass and future agencies are shy about reissuing new
rules, constitutional claims could arise again. It is more likely, however, that
both sides of the aisle will use the CRA strategically to check the president.

190. See Zinke, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 990.
191. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946–51 (1983) (stating that the Constitution requires
that all legislative action must pass the House and Senate and be signed by the President).
192. Zinke, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 983.
193. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (footnote omitted).
194. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1–2) (2018).
195. See Zinke, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 987–88.
196. Id. at 988.
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Public Interest Groups Urge Repeal

Even after Zinke and limited Democratic embrace of the CRA, there
were still progressive groups calling for Congress to abandon this tool. For
example, the Center for Progressive Reform (CPR), a left-leaning policy
organization, was heavily critical of Congress’s use of the CRA during the
Trump Administration.197 In 2018, they released, “The Congressional
Review Act: The Case for Repeal,” documenting the public health and
safety reasons for jettisoning the CRA.198 The authors argued, “By unwinding
the significant public health, safety, environmental, or financial security
protections these safeguards would have otherwise delivered, each CRA
resolution that is adopted boils down to a direct assault on the public
interest.”199 Naturally, different political parties have unique views of what
constitutes the “public interest.”200 For Democrats, this generally includes
strong environmental and public safety rules.201 For Republicans, the public
interest may benefit from fewer “onerous” regulatory restrictions.202
Ironically, Public Citizen, another progressive policy organization, was
vocal about the use of the CRA in 2017.203 In 2017, two of its scholars wrote
“Scrap the Congressional Review Act.”204 They argued:
The CRA should be repealed for two reasons. First, far from its
promise of making Congress accountable to the public, in
practice the CRA simply made Congress even more beholden to
corporate interests. . . . The second reason to repeal the CRA is
that it is so poorly drafted and vague that members of Congress
cannot agree on how to interpret the plain language of the bill.
For example, the CRA prohibits agencies from reissuing rules
that are “substantially the same” as any rule overturned under the
law, unless Congress passes a new law reauthorizing the rule. This
draconian element of the CRA is one of the main reasons it
should never have been used.205
197.
198.

See Goodwin, supra note 50.

Thomas O. McGarity et al., The Congressional Review Act: The Case for
Repeal, THE CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (May 2018), http://progressivereform.org/art
icles/CRA_Repeal_Case_050218.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ATT-4UEJ].
199. Id. at 1.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Lisa Gilbert & Amit Narang, Scrap the Congressional Review Act, REG. REV.
(Jun. 7, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/06/07/gilbert-narang-scrap-congressionalreview-act/ [https://perma.cc/5SJR-CAPK].
204. Id.
205. Id.
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These are defensible policy arguments against the CRA, but no action
better captures progressive angst with the CRA than Public Citizen’s
decision to support a resolution of the disapproval for FCC’s net neutrality
repeal just eight months after this op-ed.206 Progressive groups may not love
the use of the CRA at all times, but in this instance—when it is designed to
produce a favorable policy outcome—resolutions of disapproval can come
in handy. This is one glaring example of why, despite the number of
progressives or conservatives in Congress, they will likely never vote to
repeal the entire CRA.
The volume of CRA resolutions introduced by Democrats during the
Bush Administration also supports this prediction.207 It also tends to rebut
the argument that the CRA solely acts to diminish public safety protections.
Democrats introduced six of the thirteen CRA resolutions from 2001 to
2003.208 Their reasons were varied: from expanding access to reproductive
services, to ensuring new arsenic standards became effective more quickly.209
Had these CRA resolutions succeeded, progressive groups likely would
have praised the end result.

C.

CRA Meets Guidance

The CRA took its most expansive turn following a provocative Wall
Street Journal editorial.210 Shortly after President Trump took office,
Kimberly Strassel wrote “A GOP Regulatory Game Changer.”211 Virtually
everyone knew Republicans could use the CRA to overturn a handful of
rules issued in the last few months of the Obama Administration, but this
hardly constituted a “game changer.”
Strassel did not limit her op-ed to just regulations from 2016.212 This
game changer involved overturning rules and guidance dating back to the
beginning of the Obama Administration, or perhaps even earlier.213 Strassel
explained, “It turns out that the first line of the CRA requires any federal
agency promulgating a rule to submit a ‘report’ on it to the House and
206. See Pierce Stanley, Over 50 Major Progressive Groups Urge Democrats to Support
CRA Resolution to Restore Net Neutrality, DEMAND PROGRESS (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://demandprogress.org/50-major-progressive-groups-urge-democrats-support-craresolution-restore-net-neutrality/ [https://perma.cc/5WTN-J265].
207. See supra notes 93–101 and accompanying text.
208. See id.
209. See H.R.J. Res. 32, 107th Cong. (2001); S.J. Res. 14, 107th Cong. (2001).
210. See Strassel, supra note 13.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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Senate. The 60-day clock starts either when the rule is published or when
Congress receives the report—whichever comes later.”214 According to the
Pacific Legal Foundation’s Todd Gaziano, there were supposed to be
consequences when agencies failed to notify Congress of a rule.215
Based on Strassel’s premise, any rule that an agency failed to submit to
Congress would technically be ineffective, even though private actors might
follow the rule.216 The language of the CRA is somewhat clear, “Before a
rule can take effect, the Federal agency promulgating such a rule shall
submit to each House of Congress and to the Comptroller General a report
. . . .”217 Under Strassel’s logic, any prior rule, including guidance, could be
challenged if an agency failed to submit it to Congress.218 This would include
measures dating back to 1996, when Congress passed the CRA.219
Naturally, there is always some skepticism whenever one reads a
simple trick to undo countless controversial regulations. The Strassel op-ed
was viewed cautiously even by supporters of aggressive CRA action.220
However, it was enough to convince Senator Pat Toomey (R-PA) to issue a
request to the GAO to determine whether past guidance could be
considered a rule under the CRA.221 On October 19, 2017, roughly nine
months after the Strassel op-ed, the GAO found that past guidance on
leveraged lending was “a general statement of policy and is a rule under
CRA, which must be submitted to Congress for review.”222 Like thousands
of rules and other guidance documents, the leveraged-lending rule was
never submitted to Congress, giving Republicans some legal leverage to
undo past guidance.223

214. Id. (emphasis in original).
215. See Strassel, supra note 13.
216. Id.
217. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A) (2018).
218. See Strassel, supra note 13.
219. Id.
220. This included many in the Washington, D.C. regulatory community who were
skeptical the CRA could be used as a tool to overturn regulation from years prior. See Clyde
Wayne Crews, Jr., Lame Duck Update: Here’s How The 115th Congress Tried To
Streamline
Agency
Guidance
Documents,
FORBES
(Dec.
4,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2018/12/04/lame-duck-update-heres-how-the115th-congress-tried-to-streamline-agency-guidance-documents/#26962e6c5f24
[https://perma.cc/V5N4-TSRY].
221. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-329272, LETTER TO SENATOR
TOOMEY (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.gao.gov/products/B-329272 [https://perma.cc/S34CU9F4].
222. Id.
223. Id.
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Partisan Implications

With the legal arguments in place, Republicans quickly scoured their
caucus for a past guidance document they could rescind.224 Since virtually all
guidance fails to make its way to Congress, the universe was vast.
Republicans settled on a CFPB rule on auto lending standards.225
Senator Jerry Moran (R-KS) introduced the resolution of disapproval
on March 22, 2018; it became law less than two months later.226 The debates
in Congress around overturning a guidance document issued in 2013 (well
outside of the traditional carryover period stipulated by the CRA) were
especially contentious.227 Senator Sherrod Brown (D-OH) argued this
regulatory game changer was an illegal loophole to further push a
deregulatory agenda. He argued:
[T]oo much time has passed for Congress to use the
Congressional Review Act to roll back other protections the last
administration put in place, but they now want to open up a whole
new idea. They want to use a legal loophole to interfere with
potentially thousands more Federal decisions, potentially going
back as far as 20 years.228
Despite pleas from Democrats to avoid axing another federal rule—this
time issued in 2013, not 2016—Republicans prevailed on their vote to
overturn guidance: fifty-one to forty-seven.229 In the House, the story was the
same. However, the House did not vote until three weeks later.230
Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) argued that using the CRA to strike
down old guidance “sets a dangerous precedent.”231 She went on to note,
“While congressional Republicans so far have been very active in using the
Congressional Review Act to tear down important regulations that protect
Americans, today they are expanding their harmful efforts even further to
now go after regulatory guidance issued by the Consumer Bureau years
ago.”232 Despite these arguments, predictably, the House voted along party
lines to disapprove CFPB’s guidance: 234–175.233

224. This was based on personal experiences, as congressional staffers contacted me to
look for notable guidance that agencies never submitted to Congress.
225. See S.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2018).
226. See Pub. L. No. 115-172, 132 Stat. 1290 (2018).
227. See 164 CONG. REC. S2,200—11, (daily ed. Apr. 17, 2018).
228. Id.
229. See Sen. Roll Call Vote No. 76, 115th Cong. (2018).
230. See S.J. Res. 57, 115th Cong. (2018).
231. See 164 CONG. REC. H3, 815–23 (daily ed. May 8, 2018).
232. Id.
233. See H. Roll Call Vote No. 171, 115th Cong. (2018).
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Structural Implications

Although the partisan implications were clear from the precedent
Republicans set overturning guidance, it is not clear whether Congress was
aware of the magnitude of their action. Now the party in power could reach
back years to overturn guidance never submitted to Congress. The structural
implications are profound from a balance-of-power perspective.
Consider what this action does for every future executive, regardless of
political party. Guidance, already reviewed by agency attorneys, now will
likely go through another round of critical review and be sent to Congress.
Otherwise, a future Congress could not only rescind it, but also ensure the
rule will never be reissued in “substantially the same form.” One could
argue this largely forgotten guidance vote is already changing agency
behavior. Consider, according to the GAO, the Trump Administration has
submitted sixteen guidance documents to the GAO and Congress.234 One
CRA resolution has proven to be enough to at least partially change agency
behavior. This is far more than just undoing an agency rule in a vacuum; it
is enough to change both the substance—through signaling and barring
future agency guidance—and procedure of the executive branch.
The implications of Congress striking down this little-known CFPB
rule should be examined further by scholars, but it is a near certainty that
even Democrats will avail themselves of this power if they gain control of
both chambers of Congress and the Presidency. Again, this is a
development practically no one predicted at the outset of the CRA wave.
In the future, a Democratic president could have his or her agencies
overturn a Trump guidance document, but using the CRA to prevent
conservatives from issuing substantially similar guidance in the future is an
incredible power that Congress has only begun to exploit. The ability to
nullify major regulatory guidance—indeed virtually every action of a
president—is a notable shift in the balance of power between the executive
and legislative branches. It is unlikely President Trump will tout this
accomplishment as a regulatory landmark, but his agencies are now on
notice.

234. See Database of Rules, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
https://www.gao.gov/legal/other-legal-work/congressional-review-act#database (use keyword
“guidance”; Date Published in Federal Register “01/20/2017” to “08/30/2018”; Rule
Effective Date ending “12/31/2019”; Date Received by GAO ending “08/30/2018”)
[https://perma.cc/K69E-PL43].
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V. WHAT’S NEXT FOR THE CRA
The CRA already has lived a life longer than many expected in the
Trump Administration. It was employed sixteen times, dwarfing original
expectations.235 It is clear that Congress will continue using the CRA to
nullify regulations in the future. The question is to what extent? Republicans
will surely use it to strike down what they view as “onerous” regulations.
Democrats, as evidenced from their push to stop FCC’s repeal of net
neutrality, will employ the CRA to the extent the rescission of rules can
ensure a progressive end.
This final section offers some predictions for how future legislators will
use the CRA. It will cover possible mass changes in how Congress reviews
executive guidance, the role of independent agencies under the CRA, the
partisan lens of the law, and how courts might interpret the CRA’s
“substantially similar” bar.

A.

Guidance in Jeopardy

If the vote to overturn CFPB’s auto lending guidance taught future
presidents anything, it is that the White House counsel’s office and agency
attorneys will have to add a layer of scrutiny on all executive and
administrative guidance. Once an aberration, the GAO’s opinion on
guidance and Congress’s vote demonstrates that most future guidance
documents are subject to the CRA.
Based on the GAO’s opinion, not necessarily all guidance is subject to
repeal—just guidance covered by the CRA.236 In its opinion, the GAO noted
that the definition of a rule under the CRA is broader than the
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice and comment
requirements.237 Accordingly, some agency actions of general policy can fall
to the level of guidance under the APA, but still be considered rules under
the CRA.238
Fortunately, for those seeking a more complete history of how
guidance should be treated under the CRA, its authors gave fairly clear
instructions. In the legislative history of the CRA, Senator Nickles was
explicit that guidance documents should apply.239 He noted:
235.
236.

See id.
See GAO Issues Opinions on Applicability of Congressional Review Act to Two
Guidance Documents, supra note 14.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See 142 CONG. REC. S3, 683–87 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (providing statements
from Sens. Nickles, Reid, and Stevens).
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[T]here is a body of materials that fall within the APA definition
of a ‘rule’ and are the product of agency process, but that meet
none of the procedural specifications of the first three classes
[formal rulemakings, informal rulemakings, administrative staff
manuals]. These include guidance documents . . . .240
With this statement, the architects of the CRA made clear that
guidance is subject to the CRA. If guidance applies, then agencies must
follow the CRA and submit a report to Congress and GAO. This is hardly
a high bar to climb for agencies, but as with anything in administrative law,
process matters.
Observers should note the GAO’s intimate role in applying the CRA.
The GAO determines whether guidance applies, keeps track of major rules,
and receives all rules submitted.241 The history of the GAO’s involvement in
adjudicating what is subject to the CRA actually dates back to September
1996, six months after the CRA’s passage, according to the Congressional
Research Service (CRS).242 In their research, CRS noted that the GAO has
issued thirteen opinions on whether guidance documents are subject to the
CRA.243 In nine of the thirteen cases, the GAO found that the guidance
document was a rule within the context of the CRA.244 The CRS opinion
also was clear on what will happen if agencies fail to recognize the CRA
covers guidance: “If a joint resolution disapproving [a guidance document]
were to be enacted, the guidance would immediately no longer be in effect
and the agencies would be prohibited from issuing guidance that is
‘substantially the same.’”245 This finding only applies to guidance documents
that act as general statements of policy, however.246 In other words, they are
“statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the
manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power.”247
Past congressional votes to overturn guidance, the GAO’s opinions,
and CRS’s research provide ample, legitimate reasons for future presidents
240.
241.

Id.
See GAO Issues Opinions on Applicability of Congressional Review Act to Two
Guidance Documents, supra note 14; see also Database of Rules and FAQs, GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/legal/other-legal-work/congressional-review-act
[https://perma.cc/PHT4-7BX7].
242. See Congressional Research Service Report R43992, EVERYCRSREPORT (2016),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20171025_IN10808_76b115b319aff817387c33bd6e7
86d2e3fd06cb4.html [https://perma.cc/US69-X75X].
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281, 302, n.31 (1979) (internal quotation and citation omitted)).
247. Id.
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to treat future guidance like ordinary rulemaking and follow the CRA’s
strictures.

B.

Independent Agency Limbo

When President Trump took office in January 2017, some of
President Obama’s appointees were still heading independent agencies—
most notably the CFPB Director Richard Cordray.248 At the time, there was
little discussion of nullifying rules beyond the CRA’s carryover period
covering measures issued late in the Obama Administration. However,
political circumstances quickly changed that calculus.
The day after CFPB published its rule on arbitration agreements,
Congressman Keith Rothfus (R-PA) introduced a resolution of
disapproval.249 The rule was overturned roughly three months later.250
Although the carryover period had expired for Obama-era rules, Congress
was looking for any regulation with which it disagreed.
This scenario is likely to play out during future administrations. The
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the CFPB examples above are
illustrative. It took roughly sixteen months for President Trump to fill FTC
with a new slate of commissioners.251 During future presidential transitions,
holdover appointees from independent agencies still have power to regulate.
Until 2017, none of their regulations had ever been struck down under the
CRA.252 Given Congress’s track record in 2017 and 2018, future
independent agency appointees will likely refrain from regulating if they fear
Congress and the president may object to new regulations.
Granted, presidential transitions already are times of change in cabinet
and independent agencies, but the CRA’s institutionalization will make
future agencies think twice about issuing controversial rules until the
president has had a chance to nominate and confirm new appointees.
Otherwise, as CFPB learned with its arbitration rule, more than two years’

248. See Renae Merle, Richard Cordray Defends CFPB Arbitration Rule Amid
Speculation He Plans to Run for Ohio Governor, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/22/richard-cordray-defends-cfpbarbitration-rule-amid-speculation-he-plans-to-run-for-ohio-governor/
[https://perma.cc/NAJ3-YWRU].
249. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1040); H.R.J. Res. 111, 115th Cong. (2017).
250. See H.R. Roll Call Vote No. 412, 115th Cong. (2017).
251. See Harper Neidig, Senate Confirms Full Slate of FTC Commissioners, THE HILL
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/385096-senate-confirms-full-slate-offtc-commissioners [https://perma.cc/J8KY-7QLX].
252. See Dudley, supra note 153.
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worth of work will be undone in a matter of weeks.253 The CRA’s recent
renaissance has taught the executive branch that all agencies are on notice—
both cabinet and independent.

C.

Beyond “Substantially the Same Form”

Other legal commentators and scholars have written about the fate of
overturned rules and whether the CRA permits “substantially similar” rules
from returning.254 Much of this literature has been hypothetical in nature—
speculating on what future courts might do with a new regulation that is
“substantially [in] the same form” as a rule Congress overturned via the
CRA.255 Now that there are sixteen regulations overturned under the CRA
process, as opposed to just one, and the process has become
institutionalized, agencies are far more likely to revisit at least one
overturned regulation in the future.256 Given the controversial nature of the
regulations rescinded, a lawsuit would likely result, and we will finally have
some judicial clarity on what constitutes a substantially dissimilar rule under
the CRA.
As a threshold matter, there is some disagreement about the
justiciability of the CRA.257 CRA Section 805 provides: “[n]o determination,
finding, action, or omission under this chapter shall be subject to judicial
review.”258 The CRA’s authors were clear in their legislative history that
courts were not to intervene during the legislative process or assume

253. See Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan Search Results, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/Forward?SearchTarget=Agenda&textfield=3170-AA51
[https://perma.cc/K3YM-WFYB]. Note that the Arbitration Rule was introduced in the
spring of 2015. It was not finalized until July 19, 2017.
254. See Finkel & Sullivan, supra note 101.
255. Id. at 710.
256. House Republican Conf., supra note 4.
257. See MAEVE P. CAREY ET AL., THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA):
FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 18 (2016), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43992
[https://perma.cc/4ESW-EP4S]. The report notes:
Section 805 of the CRA states that ‘[n]o determination, finding, action, or
omission under this chapter shall be subject to judicial review.’ Two federal
appeals courts and several federal district courts have examined this section and
determined that it unambiguously prohibits judicial review of any question
arising under the CRA.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Yet, this history relates to Congress’ actions during the CRA process,
not necessarily whether an overturned rule is substantially similar.
258. 5 U.S.C. § 805 (2018).
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congressional intent from failing to adopt a resolution of disapproval.259 This
language does not mean that a court must refrain from determining whether
an agency issued a substantially similar rule. Otherwise, if courts could not
review new agency actions to restore rules and Congress generally agreed
with the new rules, injured parties would have no recourse to challenge a
rule almost identical to the original.
Moreover, the CRA’s authors were clear that the courts would have
some role in adjudicating claims arising from the law.260 Senator Nickles
noted, “[A] court with proper jurisdiction may review the resolution of
disapproval and the law that authorized the disapproved rule to determine
whether the issuing agency has the legal authority to issue a substantially
different rule.”261 This seems clear enough that courts can have a role in
deciding what is substantially the same and what is substantially different.
Senator Nickles continued, “The limitation on judicial review in no way
prohibits a court from determining whether a rule is in effect.”262 If courts
do have power to examine new rules after a resolution of disapproval, the
big question is how should they accomplishment this task?
There is some instructive language in the CRA, but not much. When
CRS was tasked with answering this question, they gave a varied response.
“[S]ameness could be determined by scope, penalty level, textual similarity,
or administrative policy, among other factors.”263 The CRS’s authors
arguably provided the most helpful hint: “In deciding cases or controversies
properly before it, a court or agency must give effect to the intent of the
Congress when such a resolution is enacted and becomes the law of the
land.”264 In other words, looking to the congressional record as to why
Congress struck down a rule might be most illustrative. However, if the
Congressional Record is sparse, or if Congress only spoke of removing an
onerous regulation in toto, divining intent will not be easy for a judge.
The CRA’s drafters also established a hierarchy of discretion, from
broadest to most restrictive, relying on the text and grant of authority of the
underlying statute.265 Three important points emerge from that statement.
259. See 142 CONG. REC. S3, 683–87 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (statement by Sens.
Nickles, Reid, and Stevens).
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. MAEVE P. CAREY ET AL., THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 18 (2016), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43992
[https://perma.cc/4ESW-EP4S].
264. See 142 CONG. REC. S3, 683–87 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (providing statements
from Sens. Nickles, Reid, and Stevens).
265. See id.
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First, if the law authorizing the disapproved rule provided broad
discretion to the agency, then regulators would likely have similarly
expansive authority to issue a substantially different rule.266 That information
is helpful, but it does not clarify where to draw the line between substantial
and minor differences.
Second, if the original law that authorized the initial agency action did
not mandate a particular rule, then regulators have discretion “not to issue
any new rule.”267 While this does not directly address how to interpret
“substantially similar,” it does illustrate how the CRA’s drafters placed great
importance on congressional intent—with respect to whether a given agency
could return to the regulatory drawing board. If Congress were to strike
down a new net neutrality rule under the CRA, for example, then the FCC
could choose not to issue another rule at all because no statute specifically
requires the FCC to do so.268 That second category is important because a
substantial fraction of federal rules do not have specific mandates and their
underlying organic statutes are often silent on specifics. For example, the
ergonomics rule that was struck down in 2001 was not explicitly authorized
in statute.269 The Department of Labor initiated the rule on its own
discretion.270
A third, and perhaps the most important, point is that when Congress
was explicit in the regulation’s authorizing statute and the grant of power to
a federal agency was “narrowly circumscribed, [then] the enactment of a
resolution of disapproval for that rule may work to prohibit the reissuance
of any rule.”271 This can be interpreted to mean that if, for example,
Congress states that the level of particulate matter in the atmosphere should
be limited to twelve micrograms per cubic meter and a CRA measure strikes
that down, the agency is prohibited from issuing the standard again.

266.
267.
268.

Mistakes,

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Henry Goldberg, FCC’s Net Neutrality Decision Corrects Telecom Act

THE HILL
(Mar.
18,
2015),
https://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/technology/235985-fccs-net-neutrality-decision-corrects-telecom-act-mistakes
[https://perma.cc/X6QH-7UDP].
269. See Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,261, 68,267 (Nov. 14, 2000) (“In the
absence of a federal OSHA ergonomics standard, OSHA has addressed ergonomics in the
workplace under the authority of section 5(a)(1) of the OSHAct. This section is referred to
as the General Duty Clause and requires employers to provide work and a work environment
free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm.”).
270. Id.
271. See 142 CONG. REC. S3, 683–87 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1996) (providing statements
by Sens. Nickles, Reid, and Stevens).
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The senators’ explanation of this third category has direct relevance for
the measures Congress has struck down recently. For instance, Section 1504
of the 2010 Dodd–Frank financial reform legislation mandated that the SEC
require resource extraction issuers to disclose payments to foreign
governments.272 That section was explicit about the information that
companies had to report.273 Yet, Congress struck down the rule.274 How do
the attorneys at the SEC craft a new rule that follows section 1504, yet is
somehow substantially dissimilar from the rule Congress struck down? It is
an unenviable position and one that does not lend itself to an easy answer.
There is likely no “right answer.” If presented before a court, a judge will
have to be the first to jump into these murky legal waters.
A quantitative versus qualitative test might be appropriate for future
courts.275 Both do not necessarily answer the “substantially similar” question,
but they do provide a framework. For instance, take the particulate matter
example. If an agency codified twelve micrograms per cubic centimeter and
Congress rescinded it under the CRA, what is a substantially dissimilar rule?
Is five, ten, fifteen, or twenty? The answer to this question might be
unknowable, but it would likely lean on rules of reason, conceptions of
agency deference, and congressional intent. If many years have passed since
the CRA resolution, tightening the standards to just ten micrograms per
cubic centimeter might not be viewed as substantially similar. There are a
host of factors to consider and they are regulation-specific and do not lend
themselves to an overarching test.
The qualitative rule (i.e. a regulation without a set numerical formula
for the private sector) might actually be easier to discern. Courts also will
have to determine congressional intent, but at least they will not have a rigid
or finite numerical formula they must navigate. The Volcker Rule is an
example of a measure without quantitative guidelines. However, there are
no easy answers for what constitutes a substantially dissimilar Volcker Rule
either.
In sum, where there is little agency discretion and Congress has
explicitly delegated certain tasks to an agency, even if the final rule comports
with original intent, Congress can change its mind and strike down the rule.
How can an agency issue a substantially dissimilar rule while concurrently
272. See Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,359
(July 27, 2016).
273. Id.
274. See H.R.J. Res. 41, 115th Cong. (2017).
275. See Sam Batkins & Adam J. White, Should We Fear Zombie Regulations, REG.
MAG. (2017), https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2017/6/regula
tion-v40n2-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QNC6-PRSW].
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following the original intent of the statute? It would appear the most recent
actions of Congress would prevail, and the rule would be barred until
Congress granted new authority to the agency.
VI. CONCLUSION
The CRA has enjoyed a renaissance during the Trump
Administration. Although Republicans have employed the CRA primarily
to repeal regulations and guidance from the Obama Administration,
increasingly, Democrats have started to use the CRA to check President
Trump. The CRA’s explosive growth has led to the institutionalization of
the law—for both political parties. It is now a weapon employed with each
controversial new rule. More than a political tool, however, the increased
use of the CRA has helped to rebalance power between the legislative and
executive branches. In the future, we can expect both parties will wield the
law to check the executive in their attempts to strike back against federal
regulation.
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